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The past three decades have seen a sharp macroeconomic takeoff in India. How have these aggregate 
changes affected the economic disparity between the different social groups? We examine this issue 
by studying the time series evolution of the economic disparities between scheduled castes and tribes 
(SC/STs) and non-SC/STs during the period 1983-2005. The distinctive feature of our study is that we 
exploit the variation in the evolution of these indicators of disparity to determine the role played by 
alternative factors in accounting for the overall patterns. Broadly, we find that both aggregate growth 
and political empowerment of SC/STs may have played a significant role in accounting for the 
declining gaps between these groups during this period. 
 
JEL Classification: J6, R2 






One of the most enduring legacies of Indian society is the caste system. This social arrangement wherein 
groups are socially segmented into various "castes" has been around in various degrees of rigidities for 
over 1500 years. The system originally was devised as a way of organizing the workforce by occupations. 
Over time however it gradually morphed into a social organization by birth, i.e., one was born into a 
caste rather than opting into one based on one's choice of occupation. Given the implicit social ordering 
of different occupations, the system opened the door to systemic discrimination and social ostracization 
of groups that belonged to the castes that were typically associated with the most menial tasks. These 
groups, who are referred to as Dalits in modern India, were thus subjected to horrific social abuses as 
well as systemic economic discrimination as the upper castes denied them access to even basic 
amenities like local water and land, education opportunities, etc.. The typical pretext for these acts was 
these groups were "unclean" and hence upper castes would get "polluted" if they interacted with them. 
    Upon independence from Britain, India adopted a new constitution in 1950 in which a special 
provision was made for these lowest castes by setting aside a certain proportion of seats in institutions 
of higher education, in public sector jobs and in Parliament. These reservations were intended to correct 
the thousands of years of social and economic discrimination endured by the "lowest" castes. The castes 
that were provided this affirmative action protection were listed under a specific schedule of the 
constitution and hence came to be known over time as Scheduled Castes and Tribes or SC/STs. 
    At the aggregate level, India has had two distinctly different phases. After over three decades of 
relatively tepid growth following independence in 1947, the period since the mid-1980s has been 
characterized by a sharp change in the economic fortunes of the country as a whole. Induced in part by 
a sequence of economic reforms, the average annual growth rate of GDP rose from around 3 percent till 
the early 1980s to upwards of 6 percent annually. Such rapid aggregate changes often accompany large 
underlying distributional changes with some sections gaining while others losing out in the process. 
Indeed, the effect of the reforms and aggregate changes on poverty has been the subject of some 
spirited debate amongst academics, observers and policymakers alike. 
    In this paper we focus on the fortunes of SC/STs since 1983. This period is particularly interesting to us 
due to its overlap with the economic takeoff of the India. Given that SC/STs are historically the poorest 
as well as being amongst the least educated groups, this focus allows us to potentially shed light on the 
effects of aggregate changes on the poor and disadvantaged. It has the additional advantage of 
potentially yielding insights regarding the efficacy of affirmative action programs, specifically the ones 
targeted toward SC/STs in India. This is of independent importance since it has now been over sixty 
years since the introduction of such constitutional protection for SC/STs, i.e., about three generations of 
SC/STs have potentially been covered by them. Clearly, some empirical feedback regarding the 
performance of these programs is desirable. 
    In recent work on this topic in Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Paul (2012), we have shown that the overall 
gaps between SC/STs and non-SC/STs have declined sharply in education and wages between 1983 and 
 
 
2004-05. Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the evolution of the ratio of mean years of education of non-SC/STs 
to SC/STs between 1983 and 2008. Panel (b) shows the evolution of the non-SC/ST mean and median 
wages relative to SC/ST wages. The two graphs reveal a similar pattern: the caste gaps have been 
declining secularly since 1983 in both education and wages. Crucially, a key finding in Hnatkovska, Lahiri 
and Paul (2012) on the measured wage convergence was that most of it was due to convergence in the 
education attainment levels of the two groups. Moreover, the occupation distributions and 
consumption levels of the two groups have also been converging though the process has been more 
muted. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
    In related work in Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Paul (2011), we also examined the intergenerational mobility 
rates of SC/STs and non-SC/STs during this period in terms of education, occupation and wages. There 
too we found that the overall intergenerational mobility rates of the two groups have been converging 
sharply between 1983 and 2004-05. In other words, SC/ST children were changing their status relative to 
their parents at rates that were faster than the corresponding rates of non-SC/ST children. Moreover, 
we also found that education has played a key role in this process of convergence. 
    Our main conclusion from this work was that the past three decades have been historic in the sense 
that they have been a period in which large historical caste disparities have begun to shrink sharply. 
Moreover, the education convergence across the castes is particularly heartening as it signals that 
disparities along caste lines are unlikely to widen in the near future. The big question though is what 
accounts for these dramatic changes? There are a number of candidate explanations that one may think 
were important. The aggregate growth takeoff may clearly have been important. The reservations 
policies in place since 1950 may have been another contributory factor as they may have aided the 
SC/STs in taking advantage of new opportunities that were opening up in a growing dynamic economy. 
The increasing political empowerment of Dalits over the past three decades may have been another 
contributory factor. 
    In this paper we attempt to evaluate the potential explanatory powers of these alternative 
explanations by exploiting the cross-state variation in the outcomes. Specifically, we use National 
Sample Survey data from rounds 38 (1983), 43 (1987-88), 50 (1993-94), 55 (1999-00) and 61 (2004-05). 
Our focus is the pattern of comovements of the caste convergence in education, wages and 
consumption with state level indicators of growth and reservation quotas. Additionally, we also examine 
outcomes in some outlier states where Dalit political empowerment was particularly marked during this 
period. 
    We find that higher growth was almost always associated with faster convergence of education 
attainment rates, wages and consumption. The initial income levels of the states in 1983 though tended 
to comove negatively with subsequent education and wage convergence. Our examination of the 
 
 
relationship between quotas and convergence suggests that quotas may have been an important 
contributory factor. However, what seems to have mattered more at the margin was the level of the 
quota in the state during the period rather than changes in the level of the quota. 
    The data also revealed a couple of outlier states. Andhra Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh stood out 
during this period as state where there was the most rapid and broad-based reduction in the caste gaps 
in education and wages. Orissa, on the other hand, was the worst performing state on the convergence 
metric almost across all the indicators that we examined. The large presence of scheduled tribes in 
Orissa suggests that there may be an important distinction between scheduled castes (SCs) and 
scheduled tribes (STs) with most of the convergence being concentrated on SCs. The relatively poor 
performance in education convergence of Madhya Pradesh, which is another state with a  relatively 
large share of STs, indicates some support for this view. We should add though that Madhya Pradesh's 
performance in other indicators such as median wage convergence is better. Hence, this aspect of the 
evidence requires more detailed analysis. 
    One state which has seen rising Dalit political power since the mid-1980s is Uttar Pradesh (UP). A Dalit 
based party called the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) has in fact been the party in power in the state for 
significant periods since the 1990s. One might expect that this would have made the caste convergence 
process faster/stronger in UP due to the increasing political empowerment of SC/STs. Exploiting the 
time series variations in the caste gaps and the vote share of the BSP, we do indeed find some evidence 
suggesting an important role for political empowerment. Inspite of these findings, it is difficult to draw 
any conclusions regarding the effect of political empowerment from the UP experience for a couple of 
reasons. First, we don't really have a comprehensive way of evaluating the counterfactual of what might 
have happened to caste gaps in UP had the Dalit political empowerment not happened. Second, the 
popular appeal of the BSP in UP may itself have been due to the perceived absence of upward mobility 
of the backward castes. Lastly, since the convergence patterns are nationwide, the importance of 
political empowerment can be gauged fully only with an All-India study as opposed to just UP. 
    Our work is related to some existing work on caste gaps in wages, consumption and employment. 
Thus, Banerjee and Knight (1985) and Madheswaran and Attewell (2007) have studied wage 
discrimination faced by SC/STs in the urban India. Similarly, Borooah (2005) has studied employment 
discrimination in the urban areas while Ito (2009) focuses on wage and employment discrimination 
simultaneously by examining data from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Consumption inequality of SC/ST 
households has been the focus of work by Kijima (2006). Lastly, Munshi and Rozensweig (2009) have 
documented the low degree of labor mobility in India. Our study differs from these in that we examine 
the data for all states and for both rural and urban areas. Moreover, by using data for five rounds of the 
National Sample Survey of households we are also able to provide a time series perspective on the 
evolution of the caste gaps, a feature that other studies have typically not examined. 
    In terms of political empowerment, our work relates to Pande (2003) who showed that greater 
political representation for SC/STs in India through reservations tended to change the composition of 
public expenditures. However, her results do not provide much guidance about whether these changes 
 
 
were beneficial for the targeted minorities. Our study measures some concrete outcomes and hence 
potentially sheds light on the welfare aspects of such representation. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the basic cross-state data facts 
which is followed by a section that examines the potential explanatory factors underlying these trends. 
The last section concludes. 
Cross-State Facts  
 
We start with an examination of the patterns across the states in terms of convergence between SC/STs 
and non-SC/STs. There are five primary variables of interest -- education, wages, consumption, 
occupation distributions and employment distribution across industries. We compare the gaps between 
the groups in 1983 with the corresponding gaps in 2004-05 for each of these indicators. Our goals are 
twofold: (a) determine whether the gaps in 2004-05 were systematically smaller for all states relative to 
1983; and (b) which states showed the sharpest narrowing of the gaps for most of the indicators. 
    Our data comes from the National Sample Survey (NSS) which has all-India coverage except for few 
inaccessible areas. We use rounds 38 (1983), 43 (1987-88), 50 (1993-94), 55 (1999-00) and 61 (2004-05). 
The NSS provides household-level data on approximately 600,000 individuals on education, 
employment, consumption, and wages as well as other social characteristics. We restrict the sample to 
individuals in the age group 16-65 who belong to male-headed households, who were not enrolled full 
time in any educational degree or diploma, and who were working full-time. The sample is restricted to 
those individuals who provided their occupation and industry of employment code information as well 
as their education information.i Full-time working individuals are defined as those that worked at least 
2.5 days per week, and who are not currently enrolled in any education institution. This selection leaves 
us with a working sample of around 165,000-182,000 individuals, depending on the survey round. The 
wage data is more limited due to the presence of self-employed individuals. As a result, the sub-sample 
with wage data is limited to about 48,000 individuals on average across rounds.ii For the state domestic 
product information we use real per capita state domestic product data available from the Handbook of 
Statistics on Indian Economy published by the Reserve Bank of India. Reservation quotas for SC/STs in 
Indian states for various years are obtained from the Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes, published by the Government of India. Finally, BSP voting shares are obtained 
from the Statistical Reports of the Election Commission of India. 
    Our measures of caste gaps for any variable is non-SCST divided by SCST. Thus, the education gap is 
average years of education of non-SC/STs divided by the average years of education of SC/STs in the 
sample. The gaps for wages and consumption are computed analogously. Note that the consumption 
numbers reported in the NSS refer to consumption of a household. We use them to compute the per 
capita consumption of that household. The consumption gaps reported here thus refer to the mean per 
capita monthly consumption expenditure of non-SC/ST households divided by the corresponding 
measure for SC/ST households. 
 
 
    Before proceeding it is worth presenting some basic cross-state sample statistics regarding our key 
measures of caste gaps. Table 1 shows the caste gaps for education, wages and consumption for 1983 
(38th round of the NSS employment survey) and 2004-05 (61st round) across all the constituent states. 
Two features are worth noting. First, the gaps, averaged across all the states, have fallen for both 
education years and wages while staying relatively unchanged for consumption, indicating a broad trend 
towards convergence in the country as a whole. Second, the dispersion in the gaps across the states (as 
measured by the standard deviation) has fallen for both the education and median wage gaps. This 
suggests a pattern of cross-state convergence in these two indicators. The dispersion in the 
consumption gap on the other hand has increased between 1983 and 2004-05. This is a recurrent 
feature of the data: consumption patterns are often at odds with those in education and wages. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
  
   We start our detailed analysis of the time series patterns with education. Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows 
the gaps in education attainment between the groups. The diagonal line is the 45 degree line. 
Observations along the 45 degree line indicate no change in the education gaps during the period while 
observations below the line indicate convergence since the gaps in 2004-05 were smaller than in 1983. 
The key feature to leap out from Panel (a) of the Figure is that there has been a sharp convergence in 
education attainment levels of the two groups during this period. Moreover, this pattern has been 
almost uniform across the different states. In terms of strong and weak performers, Andhra Pradesh 
appears to have outperformed almost everyone in narrowing the caste education gap while Orissa 
showed little change during this period. 
    Panel (b) of Figure 2  shows the gaps in the mean per capita monthly consumption expenditure 
(MPCE) between the groups. This reveals a slightly different picture relative to the education plot. 
Specifically, while there has been convergence in the consumption levels in some states, there has also 
been divergence in other states. Obviously, the convergence in education hasn't always carried over into 
convergence in consumption. However, as we have shown in Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Paul (2012), 
consumption has converged at the aggregate level for the country as a whole. These results show that 
the aggregate picture masks significant underlying state-level variation. Individually, the consumption 
gap between the castes fell the fastest in Jammu and Kashmir while gap actually rose in the northern 
belt states of Punjab, Haryana and Delhi. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
    The next variable of interest is wages. Panel (a) of Figure 3 depicts the mean wage convergence in 
each of the states between 1983 and 2004-05 while panel (b) shows the corresponding patterns for 
 
 
median wages. An overwhelming majority of states show a sharp convergence in median wages 
between the groups during this period. The convergent trends in mean wages are bit more muted. 
Relative to median wages, more states show divergence while the size of the improvement is often 
smaller in the states with convergent trends. However, overall, both measures suggest an overall 
convergence of wage gaps between the groups. In terms of individual states, Himachal Pradesh was an 
outstanding performer in terms of narrowing the caste wage gaps while Orissa performed the worst. 
     
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
    Lastly, we turn to the evidence on employment patterns of the two groups. We examine two 
indicators: the occupation distribution and the employment distribution by industry. We measure the 











indicates the share of Non-SC/STs in occupation (or industry) i, while ௌ೔
ௌ
  measures the corresponding 
share for SC/STs. d = 0 indicates complete similarity while d = 1 indicates complete segmentation or 
dissimilarity.iii  Figure 4 plots the dissimilarity indices for the occupation and industry distributions of the 
labor force of the two groups. The main pattern that emerges from the two panels of the figure is that 
cross-state evidence on convergence in the employment distribution of the groups is very mixed. While 
our previous study at the aggregate level suggests overall convergence in the employment distribution, 
albeit muted, there is clearly huge underlying variation across states. On both indicators, Punjab and 
Orissa performed the worst, i.e., they showed the largest increase in the dissimilarity index over time for 
both the occupation and industry distributions of the two groups. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 
 
        The preceding results have three main takeaways. First, education attainment and median wages 
converged not just at the aggregate level but almost in all the constituent states of India, i.e., this was a 
broad-based, countrywide phenomenon. Second, the evidence on employment and consumption 
convergence is more mixed. While both these indicators showed overall convergence at the aggregate 
level, there has been significant cross-state variation in the patterns. Third, Himachal Pradesh (and to a 
lesser extent Andhra Pradesh) was one of the better performing states on this margin as it showed wide-
spread decreases in caste gaps across a variety of indicators. On the flip side, Orissa (and to a lesser 
extent Punjab and Haryana) performed relatively poorly across all states in narrowing the caste gaps. 
 
 
    The heterogeneity in outcomes across states suggests that one might learn much more about the key 
drivers of the observed aggregate changes by exploiting these state-level variations in outcomes. This is 
precisely what we do next. 
Explanations for the trends  
 
While the overall trends towards shrinking gaps between SC/STs and non-SC/STs is encouraging news, 
what is equally important is to determine the proximate factors that may have been responsible for the 
changes. There are a few obvious explanations. The first is the role of the economic reforms in India 
during this period which translated to high growth rates in India during this period. A second factor may 
have been the reservations policy enshrined in the Constitution which provided affirmative action 
protection for SC/STs in education, jobs and political representation. A third factor could be the 
increasing political empowerment of SC/STs during this period. We examine each of these below more 
systematically. 
 
Growth and convergence 
 
We start by examining the relationship between the cross-state convergence patterns and the growth 
performance of the states. Of key interest is whether the states that grew the fastest were also the ones 
where the castes gaps narrowed the most. Figure 5 shows the relationship between the educational 
gaps and the GDP of the states. 
    Panel (a) of the figure shows the relationship between the change in the educational gaps (in years) 
and the average annual growth rate of GDP for each state during the period 1983-2005. Shaded areas 
on all figures below indicate 95% confidence interval. There is a mild but clear negative relationship 
illustrating the fact that the states which grew faster during this period were also the ones where the 
education gaps declined relatively more. Amongst the states with the highest GDP growth as well as the 
largest reduction in the education gap was Andhra Pradesh. Contrarily, Orissa stands out in terms of 
poor performance. Its growth rate during this period was about the average but the caste gap in 
education barely moved.iv  
    A related issue of interest is the importance of the initial income of the states in accounting for the 
observed convergence patterns. Panel (b) of the figure shows that the relationship between the 
education gaps and initial income was positive, i.e., the initially richer states saw a slower decline in the 
educational gaps between SC/STs and non-SC/STs. This graph also highlights the dramatic contrast 
between Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. The two states are neighbors and had fairly similar income levels in 
1983. The subsequent performance of the two in terms of narrowing the education gap between the 
SC/STs and non-SC/STs however was diametrically different. 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
     
    Next, we examine the joint evolution of wage convergence and GDP of the states. Figure 6 shows the 
patterns for median wage convergence. Panel (a) of the figure plot the change in the wage gap against 
the average GDP growth of the concerned state between 1983 and 2005. Clearly, wage gaps declined at 
a faster rate in states which grew faster during this period, corroborating the pattern for education 
convergence. Himachal Pradesh was amongst the top performers whilst Orissa again stood out in terms 
of underperforming on reducing the wage gap (the wage gap actually rose) despite a middling 
performance in terms of growth. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE 
 
    Panel (b) of Figure 6 shows the scatter plot of changes in the wage gaps against GDP in 1983 of the 
states. The graph shows an upward sloping relationship indicating that the states that were relatively 
richer in 1983 showed smaller declines in the wage gaps over this period. This pattern is similar to that 
for education where too the richer states showed the smallest reduction in the gaps. 
    A third metric of interest is consumption convergence. Figure 7 shows the relationship between 
changes in the gap in the average mean per capita consumption expenditures of non-SC/STs and SC/STs  
and GDP. Panel (a) of the figure shows that the relationship between changes in consumption gaps and 
GDP growth is almost flat, i.e., there is barely any discernible trend. Panel (b) of the figure shows that 
the relationship between changes in the consumption gaps and GDP in 1983 however is positive, i.e., 
the consumption gap tended to fall more in the relatively poorer states. This was similar to the pattern 
for wage convergence. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE 
 
    The positive relationship of all three indicators of caste convergence with initial income could indicate 
some sort of decreasing returns in the process if the gaps were small to start with in the richer states. 
However, this seems unlikely since both the consumption and wage gaps actually widened in some of 
the more well-off states in 1983 like Delhi, Haryana and Punjab. Moreover, as indicated in Figures 2 and 
3, Delhi and Haryana were two states with the largest initial gaps between the groups in both 
consumption and wages. 
    Our principal conclusion from the above is that aggregate growth was clearly a key factor associated 




Reservations and convergence 
 
We now turn to the potential effects of the reservations in educational institutions and public sector 
employment on the caste gaps. India enshrined these reservations in the Constitution that it adopted in 
1950 and are amongst the largest affirmative action programs implemented anywhere in the world. The 
quotas were set aside for SC/STs in proportion to their population representation both at the federal 
and state levels. Hence, there are periodic revisions of the quotas in every state based on the latest 
census results. This procedure for adjusting the quotas leads to sources of lags between changes in the 
population representation of SC/STs and changes in the quotas set aside for them. First, the censuses 
are conducted every ten years while the population representation of these groups changes 
continuously. Second, there are administrative lags in translating the population share numbers in the 
latest census into changes in the implemented quotas. 
    Our study is related to a recent work by Prakash (2009) who exploits the exogenous variation in 
changes in the quotas to study the impact of reservations on employment patterns, wages and 
consumption of SC/STs. His principal findings are that reservations did not significantly affect wages or 
consumption but they did affect the composition of the employment of SC/STs; quotas tended to 
increase the probability of salaried employment of SC/STs. However, Prakash (2009) focus was not on 
examining the convergence patterns between the groups, neither did it study the cross-state variation in 
the patterns. Lastly, we are also interested in overall education outcomes such as total years of 
schooling, Prakash (2009) focused on school enrollment rates in order to measure education outcomes. 
    We start by examining the cross-state comovements of quotas and education gaps. Panel (a) of Figure 
8 shows the scatter plot of the changes in the education gaps (in years) and the change in the quotas 
allocated to SC/STs between 1983 and 2005. The relationship is basically flat indicating the absence of 
any clear relationship between the two. Panel (b) of Figure 8 shows the relationship between the initial 
level of the quota in each state and the change in the education gaps that followed during 1983-2005. 
This relationship is clearly negative, i.e., states with larger quotas in 1983 saw larger declines in the 
education gaps between the castes. The key suggestion from Figure 8 is that the initial level in the quota 
was more important for changing education gaps than the changes in the quotas. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE 
 
    How important were quotas for the convergence in wages? Figure 9 shows the relationship between 
the change in the median wage gaps and quotas. The pattern is the same for both mean and median 
wages. Larger increases in the quotas were accompanied by bigger declines in the wage gaps between 
 
 
the groups (Panel (a)). On the other hand, akin to the result for education gaps, higher initial levels of 
the quota were typically also associated with larger reductions in the caste wage gaps. 
    The relationship between the initial level of the quotas and the subsequent changes in the education 
and wage gaps we have found here is in the spirit of Hnatkovska and Lahiri (2011) who develop a skill 
and occupation choice model to show that caste gaps can decline in response to a rise in aggregate 
growth without any change in reservations for SC/STs as long as the pre-existing affirmative action 
inducements are sufficiently strong. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE 
  
    Lastly, Figure 10 shows the relationship between quotas and the changes in the consumption gaps 
between SC/STs and non-SC/STs. The relationship between changes in the quota and the consumption 
gap is similar to that between the change in quotas and the wage gap. The difference lies in the 
relationship between the initial level of the quotas and changes in the gaps. Panel (b) of 10 shows a 
positive relationship while the corresponding relationships for education gaps and wage gaps were 
negative. This is an intriguing feature of the data and reinforces our previous impression that 
consumption dynamics at the household level are often at odds with some of the individual level 
movements in education and wages. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 10 HERE 
 
    Overall, we conclude from this analysis that reservation quotas may well have been important in 
explaining the declining caste gaps. However, the effect is nuanced in that the level of the quotas were 
possibly more important than the effects of changes in the quotas in accounting for the cross-state 
variation in the caste gaps in education, wages and consumption. It is worth noting that these results are 
consistent with the findings of Prakash (2009) who found fairly muted effects of quotas. 
 
Political Empowerment: The Case of Uttar Pradesh 
 
A third possible explanation for the declining overall caste gaps is that SC/STs have become more 
politically empowered over the course of the past 30 years and this has translated into lesser 
discrimination, more opportunities and consequently, better relative outcomes. Indeed Pande (2003) as 
well as Duflo (2005) document how political representation of minorities influence public policy in terms 
 
 
of expenditure patterns on public goods. However those papers do not examine the effect of these 
changes on the welfare of the targeted groups. 
    Is there any evidence to suggest that political empowerment and representation may have had a role 
to play in narrowing the caste gaps? We approach this question by looking at the case of Uttar Pradesh 
(UP). UP is special amongst the states in that a party called the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which is 
essentially an SC/ST and other backward castes (also called Dalits) supported party. If political 
empowerment is indeed an important factor underlying the overall trends one would expect to see UP 
amongst the states that performed the best in narrowing the caste gaps. 
    As can be seen from Figures 2 and 3 above, UP did not show any dramatic decline in the gaps between 
SC/STs and non-SC/STs in education, consumption and wages between 1983 and 2004-05. On most of 
the indicators, UP had an average caste gap in both 1983 and 2004-05. However, this picture is 
potentially a bit misleading since the BSP was only formed in 1984 and began to seriously contest 
elections in 1989. The political rise of the party was quite swift in that it actually became part of a 
coalition government in 1992 and continued to be in power through different coalition governments off 
and on all the way through to 2007 when it was voted to power on its own. The key question then is 
how have the caste gaps evolved since 1992 and are there any differences in the patterns before and 
after 1992? 
 
INSERT FIGURE 11 HERE 
 
    Figure 11 shows the paths of the median and mean wage gaps (Panels (a) and (b) respectively) and 
the vote share of the BSP in the UP Assembly elections since 1989 (which was the first year that the BSP 
fought elections in the state in any major organized way). The Figure reveals two interesting features. 
First, the wage gaps between the two groups actually widened between 1983 and 1993-94 (left axis of 
the graphs). Second, wage gaps have been declining since 1993, which is the first year in which the BSP 
was actually part of the government as part of the ruling coalition. 
    Is this pattern restricted to the caste wage gaps? Figure 12 shows the education gaps (in years) and 
the per capita mean consumption gaps (Panels (a) and (b)) between the castes against the BSP vote 
share. This Figure corroborates the impression given by Figure 11. The education convergence was 
weaker before 1993 than after 1993, while consumption gaps widened till 1993 before beginning to fall. 
Clearly, even though UP began and finished the period 1983-2007 being an average performer in terms 
of the caste gap trends, there was significant underlying time variation in the trends suggesting a key 
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    Clearly, there could be other factors accounting for the time trends in the caste gaps documented 
above. First, it could be that widening gaps between the groups during 1983-93 was a nation-wide 
trend. Figure 1 shows that that was most certainly not the case. Both education and wage gaps fell 
between 1983 and 1993. Hence, UP behaved differently from the norm during that period. Second, it 
could be that UP's growth performance during 1983-93 and post 1993 could account for the different 
behavior of the caste gaps in education and wages in these two phases. However, per capita income in 
UP grew at an average annual rate of 1.6 percent during 1983-93 and at 1.5 percent during 1993-2005. 
Thus, there was hardly any difference in the growth rates during the two phases. Between 2005 and 
2008 UP has grown at a much faster per capita annual rate of 5.6 percent. But this is precisely the period 
when the rate of decline of the wage gap between SC/STs and non-SC/STs has slowed down. Based on 
this, we do not believe that growth has been the key underlying driver of the caste gaps in UP since 
1983. Lastly, it is important to point out that the reservation quotas in UP stayed unchanged over the 
sample. Hence, additional affirmative action protection cannot account for the reduction in the caste 
gaps in UP since 1992. 
    While our results from UP are most certainly not definitive regarding the effect of political 
empowerment of SC/STs on the caste gaps, they are suggestive of the fact that this may have been an 
important factor nation-wide in driving its dynamics. This deserves more in-depth and careful analysis 




The past three decades have been a period of rapid and historic changes in India at the aggregate level. 
In recent work Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Paul (2011 and 2012) have shown that this period has also proven 
to be historic in terms of the changes that have occurred in the fortunes of scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes (SC/STs). Between 1983 and 2004-05, SC/STs have dramatically narrowed their gaps 
with non-SC/STs in education attainment rates, wages and consumption. Moreover, gaps in the 
occupation distributions have also narrowed. In this paper we have examined the potential 
contributions of three factors for these trends: aggregate growth effects, reservations and political 
empowerment. The key innovation of the study is to exploit the cross-state variation in outcomes (the 
key measures of convergence across castes) to ascertain the explanatory potential of the different 
channels. 
    Our primary finding is that aggregate growth effects are usually important for education and wage 
convergence across the castes. Interestingly, we find that the initially richer states saw a slower 
reduction in the education, wage and consumption gap. We also find relatively mixed associations of 
reservations with our measures of convergence. While the initial level of quotas seem to correlate 
 
 
positively with the subsequent convergence of the education and wage gaps, i.e., larger initial quotas 
appear to coincide with faster subsequent convergence. The change in the quotas during the period 
however have a more muted relationship with caste convergence rates. Education convergence, for 
example, appears to be uncorrelated with changes in the quotas. 
    We also examine the potential effect of political empowerment of the SC/STs by examining in greater 
detail caste gaps in Uttar Pradesh (UP). Examining the joint patterns of the vote share of the Dalit party 
(the BSP) and the caste gaps in education, wages and consumption since the mid-1980s, we do find 
some evidence suggestive of a convergence payoff to greater political empowerment of SC/STs in UP. 
This is a topic that deserves closer examination due to issues associated with identification of political 
empowerment as well as reverse causality. We intend to pursue it in future work. 
    One last point is worth stressing. A common feature of a number of our results is that the 
consumption patterns are often at odds with the patterns in education and wages. This probably 
partially reflects the fact that the consumption data reflects the household while the education and 
wage data is at the individual level. However, whether or not there are interesting intra-household 
redistribution and insurance mechanisms at play is an issue of independent interest which may worth 
pursuing in future research. 
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Figure 1. Education and Wage Convergence 
  
(a) Education gaps in years (a) Wage gaps in years 
 
Figure 2. Cross-State Education and Consumption Convergence 
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Figure 3. Wage Convergence Across States 
  
(a) Mean wage convergence (a) Median wage convergence 
 
Figure 4. Occupation and Industry Convergence  
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Figure 5. Educational Convergence and GDP 
  
(a) Educational convergence and growth (a) Educational convergence and initial GDP 
 
 
Figure 6. Median Wage Convergence and GDP 
  
(a) Median wage convergence and GDP growth  (a) Median wage convergence and initial GDP  
 
 
Figure 7. Consumption Convergence and GDP 
  
(a) Consumption convergence and GDP growth (a) Consumption convergence and initial GDP 
 
 
Figure 8. Educational Convergence and Reservation Quotas 
  
(a) Educational convergence and quota changes  (a) Educational convergence and initial quotas 
 
 
Figure 9. Wage Convergence and Reservation Quotas 
 
 
(a) Median wage convergence and quota changes (a) Median wage convergence and initial quotas 
 
 
Figure 10. Consumption Convergence and Reservation Quotas 
  
(a) Consumption convergence and quota changes  (a) Consumption convergence and initial quotas 
 
 
Figure 11. Uttar Pradesh: Wage convergence and Political Empowerment 
 
 
(a) Median wage convergence and BSP vote share (a) Mean wage convergence and BSP vote share 
 
 
Figure 12. Uttar Pradesh: Caste Convergence and Political Empowerment 
  







                                                             
i We also consider a narrower sample in which we restrict the sample to only males and find that our 
results remain robust. 
 
ii Wages are computed as the daily wage/salaried income received by respondents for the work done 
during the previous week (relative to the survey week). Wages can be paid in cash or kind. If paid in kind 
wages are evaluated at the current retail prices. We convert wages into real terms using state-level 
poverty lines that differ for rural and urban sectors. We express all wages in 1983 rural Maharashtra 
prices. 
 
iii While there is no uniformly accepted metric for comparing distributions, this index is often used in 
analyzing inter-group heterogeneity. 
 
iv Kerala too showed a very small decline in the caste gap in education years. However, the initial gap in 
1983 in Kerala was itself very small -- it was amongst the three states with the smallest caste gaps in 
education. 
 
 
